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Abstract
Like many disputes, Romeo and Juliet is a story with no winners; the outcome is destined to be lose-lose.
Disputes are an inevitable part of human interaction and people need to learn effective and reasonable ways of
dealing with their disputes. The question is how can this be done in a way that leaves people intact. The article
compares and contrasts two modes for resolving disputes: adjudication and alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). The article looks at what happens when disputes arise-how do problems become "disputes" and what
do people do about them? The role of lawyers as dispute creators as well as dispute resolvers is examined, as is
the current state of the adversary system and litigation. The author problematizes the rush of lawyers into the
ADR game and questions whether it is in response to decreased billings rather than from a desire to provide
more creative, disputant friendly services. The author argues that ADR is not the great panacea it has been
touted to be. It clearly has a place in disputes but it is as imperfect as any other process that exists or could be
created. Because disputes arise from human interaction, there may be as many types of dispute resolutions as
there are people. Imperfect people will create imperfect and fallible processes. Those who seek to assist in
dispute resolution must accept that their role is one of assistance, not control. Lawyers are not necessarily well
suited to this role. It is incumbent on those who wish to engage in the service of dispute resolution to
recognize their own situatedness and interests.
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WOULD ADR HAVE SAVED ROMEO
AND JULIET?©
By PAM MARSHALL*
Like many disputes, Romeo and Juliet is a story with no
winners; the outcome is destined to be lose-lose.
Disputes are an inevitable part of human interaction
and people need to learn effective and reasonable ways
of dealing with their disputes. The question is how can
this be done in a way that leaves people intact. The
article compares and contrasts two modes for resolving
disputes: adjudication and alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). The article looks at what happens
when disputes arise-how do problems become
"disputes" and what do people do about them? The
role of lawyers as dispute creators as well as dispute
resolvers is examined, as is the current state of the
adversary system and litigation. The author
problematizes the rush of lawyers into the ADR game
and questions whether it is in response to decreased
billings rather than from a desire to provide more
creative, disputant friendly services. The author argues
that ADR is not the great panacea it has been touted to
be. It clearly has a place in disputes but it is as
imperfect as any other process that exists or could be
created. Because disputes arise from human
interaction, there may be as many types of dispute
resolutions as there are people. Imperfect peoplewill
create imperfect and fallible processes. Those who
seek to assist in dispute resolution must accept that
their role is one of assistance, not control. Lawyers are
not necessarily well suited to this role. It is incumbent
on those who wish to engage in the service of dispute
resolution to recognize their own situatedness and
interests.
Comme dans beaucoup d'autres disputes, Romeo et
Juliette est une histoire sans gagnants; l'issue est
destin6e A etre une perte pour Pun et I'autre. Les
disputes sont indvitables dans les interactions humaines
et les gens doivent apprendre des mani~res efficaces et
raisonnables pour rdsoudre leurs conflits. La question
est comment pourrait-on faire cela d'une fagon qui
laisserait les gens intacts. Cet article compare et
contraste deux mani~res pour rdsoudre les disputes: le
tribunal et la r6solution alternative des disputes (RAo).
L'article examine ce qui se passe quand les disputes
surviennent-comment des probl mes finissent par
devenir des "disputes" et que font les gens pour les
rdsoudre? Le r6le des avocats comme A la fois
responsables de la cr6ation et de la r6solution des
disputes est examin6, de m~me que l'tat actuel du
syst~me adversaire et le litige. L'auteure questionne la
hlte des avocats dans le jeu de la RAD et se demande si
c'est en r6ponse a une diminution de facturation plut6t
qu'au d~sir de pourvoir des services plus cr6atifs qui
tiennent compte des parties en litige. L'auteure avance
que ]a RAD n'est pas la grande panace comme on a
voulu qu'elle soit. Elle a ividemment sa place dans la
resolution des disputes mais elle est aussi imparfaite
que tout autre processus qui existe ou qui pourrait atre
cr66. Du fait que les disputes viennent des rapports
humains, il pourrait y avoir autant de genres de
solution qu'il y a de gens. Des gens imparfaits finiront
par crder des processus imparfaits et faillibles. Ceux
qui chercher As s'impliquer dans la r6solution des
conflits doivent admettre que leur r6le consiste A
assister et non s contr6ler. Les avocats ne sont pas
n6cessairement bienpr6par6s hjouer ce rfle. II revient
A ceux qui d6sirent s'engager dans le service de la
r6solution des disputes d'y reconnaeitre leur place et
leurs propres int6rts.
01998, P. Marshall.
* R.N., LL.B., LL.M., of the College of Nurses of Ontario. A version of this article was
presented at the Canadian Bar Association-Ontario 1998 Annual Institute in Toronto. I wish to
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two Households both alike in dignity
(In fair Verona, where we lay our scene)
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean.
From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life,
Whose misadventur'd piteous overthrows
Doth with their death bury their parents strife.
The fearfulpassage of their death-mark'd love
And the continuance of their parents' rage,
(Which but their children's end nought could remove)
Is now the two hours' traffic of our stage,
The which if you with patient ears attend
What here shall miss, our toll shall strive to mend.1
Conflict is the stuff of great literature. Shakespeare's work
abounds with tragic stories of unresolved disputes; Romeo and Juliet is
one of his finest and most loved examples. It is popularly seen as a
1 W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, "The Prologue," 1-14 [hereinafter Romeo and Juliet].
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romantic love story, though its central theme is of conflict and failed
resolution. The Capulets and Montagues are in the midst of a long-
standing dispute whose source or reason is undeclared. The families
hate each other and their servants engage each other in battle whenever
their paths cross on the street. There seems no hope for resolution.
Their children, the star-crossed lovers Romeo and Juliet, fall in love but
recognize that their families will never accept their union. In a
Shakespearean example of tragic irony, they each commit suicide. It is
only after their deaths and the sad truth of their love for each other is
made known that the families are able to put aside their long-standing
feud. This is a play about extremes and opposites: young love and age-
old hate; anticipatory joy and hopeless anguish; the weight of the past
and the hope of the future; the promise of union and the pain of loss.
Like many disputes, Romeo and Juliet is a story with no winners;
the outcome is destined to be lose-lose. Inevitably, disputes are part of
human interaction, though fortunately most do not end with the death of
the participants. However, the emotional and financial cost can leave
the disputants feeling that too much has been lost. Being in the world
leads to being in conflict. Arguably, life without conflict would be boring
and tedious, though life amid constant dispute and conflict can be cruel
and stressful. Since people cannot avoid disputes, unless they choose the
life of a hermit, it seems clear that people must learn more about
effective ways to deal with the inevitable disputes that arise. And, unlike
Romeo and Juliet, they must learn about ways to survive them.
The central question is: "how can people deal with conflict in a
way that leaves them intact-how do people resolve conflict without
destroying each other in the process?" Personal conflicts and disputes
are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I will look at the conflicts,
disputes, and problems that reach a more public awareness-the types of
conflicts or disputes that people seek assistance in resolving. In other
words, I will examine disputes that end up on the desk of a lawyer and
could end up on the road to the courthouse. This article will provide a
preliminary look at the nature of disputes-how and why they get
labelled as disputes and, once labelled, what people do about them.
Once I have examined the typology of disputes, I will look at the
processes that people have used to resolve them and the advantages and
disadvantages of certain kinds of resolutions. I will also examine how
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lawyers are involved as dispute creators and problematize the role of
lawyers in dispute resolution alternatives.2
This article compares and contrasts adjudication and ADR. 3 It is
divided into three parts. Part II looks at what happens when disputes
arise, namely how problems turn into disputes and what people do with
the disputes. I briefly examine the role of lawyers as dispute-resolvers
and creators and provide an introduction into the types of resolutions
available. In Part III, I examine and problematize the current state of
the adversary system by surveying some of its proponents and detractors.
In Part IV, I look at ADR and its claims. I critique the common notion
that ADR is a panacea to all that ails the adversary system. I will examine
the benefits of ADR in general and mediation in particular. I will argue
that just as adjudication is not always wrong, ADR is not always right. I
will conclude by noting that ADR is not the great "hype hope" that it has
been touted to be. While it clearly has a place in the resolution of
disputes, my ultimate claim is that perfect processes cannot be found. I
will suggest that because disputes come from human interaction, there
may be as many dispute resolutions as there are people. In searching for
perfect processes and eagerly jumping from the adjudication/litigation
fire, lawyers and others must be wary of ending up in the ADR frying pan.
The challenge for potential dispute resolvers is to reduce the destructive
heat by channeling disputes and their resolution into cooler and less
antagonistic channels.
II. DISPUTES ARE CREATED, NOT BORN
Thou?-Why, thou wilt quarrel with a man that hath a hair more or a hair
less in his beard than thou hast. Thou wilt quarrel with a man for cracking
nuts, having no other reason but because thou hast hazel eyes .4
2 This article is the beginning of a broader inquiry into the theory of dispute resolution. My
broader thesis starts with the belief that disputes are identified by the people that are involved.
Often the people charged with the ability to name something a dispute are lawyers. People arrive at
a lawyer's office with a problem, they seek a solution and the lawyer may provide one. Once the
problems are identified and named as disputes, people seek someone to blame. If a lawyer sees his
or her job as naming the problem a dispute, assisting in apportioning blame, and suggesting a legal
process that can solve the situation, this is exactly what will occur. Situations that may have been
merely problems become not only disputes but legal disputes.
3 Throughout this article, ADR refers to the various forms of alternatives used to resolve
disputes other than traditional litigation.
4 Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene i, 18-22 (Mercutio admonishing Benvolio for his propensity
to quarrel).
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Modern day life is not unlike fair Verona. Conflicts continue to
be part of everyday existence. Some people, like Mercutio, are more
prone to them than others and will find a dispute in even the most minor
of situations. However, conflicts do not spring to life as full-blown
disputes; their development is more gradual. They are quarrels,
problems, concerns, issues, or troubles. But, what begins as a quarrel or
minor disagreement can and often does escalate into something more.
To turn a problem into a dispute, people must see the situation as
important enough that they will not "let it go" or ignore it and it must
affect them in more than a minor way. A helpful typology is offered by
Roger Miller and Austin Sarat:
Disputes begin as grievances. A grievance is an individual's belief that he or she (or a
group or organization) is entitled to a resource which someone else may grant or deny ....
People respond to such beliefs in various ways. They may, for example, choose to "lump
it" so as to avoid potential conflict .... They may redefine the problem and redirect
blame elsewhere. They may register a claim to communicate their sense of entitlement to
the most proximate source of redress, the party perceived to be responsible.
5
Disputes involve the recognition by the parties involved that they
are entitled to some kind of resolution or solution to the dispute. For
something to be called a dispute, it must have moved past the solitary
awareness of one person to a joint recognition with at least one more
person. Both parties need not agree on the nature of the dispute, its
origin, or its substance, but they must at least agree that there is a
dispute. If only one person sees a problem, it is not yet a dispute.
However, a dispute may arise specifically because the other party
does not recognize the existence of a problem or does not perceive that
the other party is entitled to any redress. According to Miller and Sarat,
if one party accepts the entitlement of the other, there is no dispute. It
is only when there is partial or total rejection of the other party's claim
that a dispute is born.6
A. Second Cup Dispute
The following personal experience of mine will help to illustrate
the typology of disputes. On many Sunday mornings during the fall of
1996 when I was enrolled in the core course of my LL.M. in ADR, I would
do my weekly reading over coffee in a local coffee shop. On one
5 R.E. Miller & A. Sarat, "Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture" (1980-81) 15 L & Soc'y Rev. 525 at 527 [emphasis in original].
6 See ibid.
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particular Sunday, early in the course, I was distracted by a group of six
women sitting at a table close by. As the tables in this particular coffee
shop are quite close together and these women were animated in their
conversation, I could not help overhearing what they discussed. It
transpired that they were teachers at a local public school and were
involved in a "situation" with a parent. It was not completely clear what
the nature or substance of the problem was, but that is not material.
As the discussion progressed, I realized that each of the women
was proposing a solution or resolution to the problem and each of them
had a somewhat different answer. One of them was prepared to "let it
go." "If we ignore Mr. X," she said, "he will get tired of complaining
and go away and bother someone else." Another woman favoured a
one-on-one confrontation, though she framed it as a "chat." She was
convinced that she could "talk sense to Mr. X" and explain the school's
position and that this would resolve the situation.
The third woman was convinced that a one-on-one would be
useless and that Mr. X was too unreasonable to listen to woman number
two and that something more was required. She suggested that a couple
of people from the school, including someone in a position of power (i.e.
the principal or vice-principal), should arrange a meeting with Mr. X and
present a unified front to outline the school's reasonable and unyielding
position. The fourth woman thought that number three's idea would
escalate the situation. She was convinced that Mr. X would not take
such a tactic lightly and would not accept the edict of the school. She
was convinced that a "more formal" process was required because "this
guy is trouble; he is not going to go away." She suggested a variation of
the third woman's suggestion. While she agreed that a meeting should
take place, she thought that the school should involve not only their own
representatives, but a third party who would be seen by Mr. X as
impartial or fair. Mr. X would not be required to attend the meeting,
but the school would inform him about the neutral party who was to
attend and encourage him to participate in an attempt to resolve the
situation. Mr. X would be advised that the meeting was not binding but
that the parties would be working toward a resolution of the situation
that both could accept.
Woman number five thought that all of the other suggestions
were "too nice" and that everyone was underestimating Mr. X. "He will
not agree to anything unless someone makes him," she said and
continued: "We should involve the school board. They can arrange a
meeting between Mr. X and the school. We should let them decide the
situation." Woman number six was having none of this. She thought
that all of the suggestions were reasonable attempts at facilitating
[VOL. 36 No. 4
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resolution. However, she declared, "Mr. X is an idiot and a bully. He
will not listen to any of this. We are in the right anyway, we do not need
to deal with him. If he has a problem with what we are doing, let him
sue us!"
Clearly this group could not come to agreement about how this
"situation" should be resolved. In fact, they were not in agreement
about whether there was a dispute. They continued talking and
eventually agreed to talk to some other teachers involved before
deciding which course of action to follow. The various members of the
group had identified a number of possible ways to deal with or resolve
the matter. They ranged from avoidance, through discussion, to
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and finally, adjudication. Without
realizing what they were doing, they had outlined most of the possible
methods of resolution, discussed some of their advantages and
disadvantages, and determined that more information and dialogue was
needed before any action would be taken.7
It was clear to me as the listener that the group did not have a
common understanding that they were involved in a dispute. If I had
entered the conversation and asked each of them what was happening, I
would probably have received as many names for the situation as there
were women. For some, all that was going on was a "problem;" for
others it was less than that, more of a "situation;" for still others it was
not concretized as either a problem or situation. Few of the women
would have described what was going on as a dispute.
This episode helps to illustrate that disputes are in the eyes or
minds of the beholder. They do not develop or exist in a vacuum. They
do not have an independent definition or context. Disputes exist when
someone labels them as such. As William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and
Austin Sarat have argued, disputes are not independently realizable
things that exist outside of the context in which they arise; they are social
constructs.8 Their "shapes reflect whatever definition the observer gives
to the concept."9 In many instances, much of a dispute exists solely in
the minds of the disputants. Disputes emerge and are transformed,
mutating from experience to grievance to dispute. They assume various
7 Oddly enough, at the time, I was reading L. Greenhalgh, "Managing Conflict" in R.J.
Lewicki et aL, eds., Negotiations: Readings, Exercises and Cases, 2d ed. (Boston: Irwin, 1993) 7.
8 W.L.F. Felstiner, R.L. Abel & A. Sarat, "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... " (1980-1981) 15 L. & Soc'y Rev. 631 at 631.
9 ibid. at 632.
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shapes, follow certain paths toward resolution and "lead to new forms of
understanding."10
Since the publication of the Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat article in
1981, the ideology of disputes has been frequently examined. The ADR
movement has flourished and disputes and the methods for their
resolution have been analyzed, dissected, and categorized. Though the
literature has increased, it is not clear that there has been a concurrent
increase in understanding. People are still confused about disputes:
what they are, where they come from, and what to do about them.
In Romeo and Juliet, the Capulets and the Montagues dealt with
their dispute by engaging in battle whenever the two families got
together. While this method was aimed at resolution, it only served to
ensure that the dispute continued to exist and escalate. Whatever the
reasons underlying their family feud, no attempt at resolution was made.
Each party had obviously rejected whatever claim the other had made.
Instead of looking for non-violent ways to resolve the situation, the
Capulets and Montagues used a method not uncommon in today's world
of human interaction. They avoided dealing with the conflict and used
violence as a means towards forced resolution. Many people, when
faced with conflict, respond in a similar manner.
It may be helpful here to discuss what is meant by the term
"resolution." Roderick A. Macdonald notes that resolution can be
defined as "constancy in the pursuit of a purpose; resolution as the
progression from discord to concord; ... resolution as the act of
resolving."11 These definitions can be grouped into three categories: (1)
resolution as outcome; (2) resolution as process; or (3) resolution as
symbolism.1 2
There is clearly overlap between the three categories. One
cannot speak of resolution as outcome without having progressed
through resolution as process or, to a lesser degree, resolution as
symbolic of the constancy of purpose in striving to resolve. Each
category weaves in and out through the other. My project is to place the
notion of resolution inside the process of dispute resolution, to refer to
resolution as outcome or solution. Once people name their situation a
dispute, a resolution of some kind is usually sought, and the variety of
10 Ibid at 623.
11 R.A. Macdonald, "High Resolution Dispute Resolution: Finding A Focus" (Seminar,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Part-Time Programme in ADR, 22 August 1996)
[unpublished].
1 2 See ibid. at 5.
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efforts toward resolution will be as different as the disputes and the
people resolving them.
To categorize resolution is as difficult as categorizing disputes.
Paul Emond agrees that to do so is somewhat problematic: "disputes are
seldom ever static; like the factors that give rise to the dispute and the
parties to the dispute, they are continually changing." 13  The
characteristics interact within and around a dispute in ways that are
constantly changing and unique. No two disputes are the same; no two
disputants are the same. Therefore, no consistent mode of resolution
will be appropriate. Others have noted that disputes are difficult to
quantify or measure. They are not always easy to identify or count:
Disputes are not discrete events like births or deaths; they are more like such constructs
as illnesses and friendships, composed in part of the perceptions and understandings of
those who participate in and observe them.
Disputes are drawn from a vast sea of events, encounters, collisions, rivalries,
disappointments, discomforts and injuries.... Some things ... become disputes through a
process in which injuries are perceived, persons or institutions responsible for remedying
them are identified, forums for presenting these claims are located and approached,
claims are formulated acceptably to the forum, appropriate resources are invested, and
attempts at diversion resisted. The disputes that arrive at courts can be seen as the
survivors of a long and exhausting process.
1 4
The vast sea of events that Marc Galanter describes varies from
person to person and lived experience to lived experience. However,
everyone experiences the storms that are inevitable and searches for a
way to stabilize and calm the rough seas of life. An injury is perceived, a
grievance is voiced, and a claim is made. If the claim is rejected, people
reach a stage where they become aware that a dispute exists. They then
attempt some measure of resolution. They realize that their attempts
are unsuccessful or inadequate and they look for help.15
It is important to point out that dispute awareness,
transformation, and resolution are experienced differently by people.
The particular social position that people occupy will impact on not only
their personal perception of whether a dispute exists but other peoples'
acceptance of their perception. Marginalized people will not be given
13 D.P. Emond, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Overview" in D.P. Emond,
ed., Commercial Dispute Resolution (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1989) 1 at 12.
14 M. Galanter, "Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society" (1983) 31 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 4 at 12 [hereinafter "Reading the Landscape"].
15 Or, as William Felstiner, Richard Abel and Austin Sarat have noted, people move through
perception of injurious experiences (grievances), they voice these to the offending party (claims)
and, if the claim is not granted, it becomes a dispute: see Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 8.
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recognition of a dispute's existence as readily as will someone in a
majority group. If disputes are not recognized as disputes, then there is
no requirement for any action to resolve them. If the existence of a
problem is not accepted, there is no reason to look for resolution. It is
clear that people in marginalized groups, such as the poor, minority
groups, and the disabled, are less likely to have their problems
recognized, less likely to have them labeled as disputes, and less likely to
be seen as having a legitimate claim to redress.16 Lawyers' complicity in
this process of dispute naming deserves a brief examination.
B. Lawyers'Role in Dispute Resolution
ADR is touted by lawyers and others as useful in equalizing access
to justice. However, lawyers' role in the early stages of disputes places
them in a position of great responsibility and opportunity. Their role
includes their complicity in identifying problems as legitimate, their
involvement, linguistically as well as concretely, in transforming
problems into disputes, and their interest in turning disputes into claims
for redress. Lawyers can do as much or as little as they choose. They
can use ADR as a means to improve access or merely as a means to
improve their income.
Traditionally, lawyers' involvement in disputes and the resolution
of disputes is seen as less than positive. This is evidenced, at least to
some degree, by the overwhelming dissatisfaction which people express
about the justice system in general and adjudication in particular.
Lawyer jokes abound; courts are seen as places to avoid rather than
places where one could seek justice. Despite the proliferation of
television shows that glamorize lawyers, most people avoid involvement
with the justice system at all costs.
Enter ADR. The justice system is in trouble and the response
from the legal community was not to fix the mess that they had helped to
16 The issue of access to justice in general, and to alternative dispute mechanisms in
particular, for people in differing social positions and ethnic groups, is a topic beyond the scope of
this effort. See R. Delgado et aL, "Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 1359 (suggesting that ADR disadvantages
minority participants); T. Grillo, "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women" (1991)
100 Yale L.J. 1545; P.E. Bryan, "Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power"
(1992) 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441 (arguing that mediation is dangerous for women in family law cases
involving women); E.K. Yamamoto, "Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities" (1990) 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 341 (arguing that the push towards ADR is an effort to
constrict court access and expedite case dispositions, and that minority rights assertion allows
minorities to use judicial power to gain entry into the polity).
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create, but to look for an alternative. The claim is that the alternative is
not just different but better. ADR is transformative, egalitarian, and
restorative: 17
[T]he A.D.R. movement challenges traditional modes of dispute resolution and invites
disputants to search for new and more effective ways of resolving disputes. ADR breaks
down preconceived and largely outmoded notions of how disputes are best resolved. It
challenges the dominant role of judicial litigation in the dispute resolution process and
legitimizes alternative processes and alternative ways of resolving disputes, particularly in
the private sphere. 18
For Emond, ADR has a role in assisting parties to dissect disputes,
as well as, or even instead of, resolving them. He holds out great hope
for the proponents of ADR. He argues that the challenge for ADR
providers must be to assist parties to determine the real nature of their
dispute and then fit the appropriate resolution process to it. He
fantasizes that this could mean that
disputes will not necessarily march toward the court-house steps and the opportunities
for settlement will not necessarily be confined to reaching agreement on what the parties
expect the court to do. Creativity and innovation become the hallmark of the process, and
not tradition and preconceived structure.19
A number of years have passed since Emond wrote this hopeful
and encouraging call to ADR practitioners. Even as a relatively new
student of the movement, I have observed that the call has gone mainly
unheeded. I do not see the innovation and creativity in the process that
he had hoped for. I see lawyers jumping on the ADR bandwagon in
response to the public's rejection of litigation and lawyers. And the
rejection comes not because they want ADR necessarily, but because they
want anything but law and lawyers. The irony is that with the co-
optation and legalization of ADR, the public has landed very close to
where it began. The alternative looks a lot like a first cousin rather than
an unrelated stranger.
Emond is not alone in his vision of ADR as a harbinger of a better
world for dispute resolution. Other writers have also envisioned the
move to ADR as creating a climate that would inspire "a burst of creative
17 See, for example, R.A.B. Bush & J.P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to
Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994). The authors
suggest that mediation can transform the parties into more psychologically and morally aware
individuals.
18 Emond, supra note 13 at 24.
1 9 Ibid.
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innovation and experimentation." 2 0 Galanter positively gushes with
what he sees as the promise of ADR:
Compared to earlier crusades for alternatives, the contemporary ADR movement is more
informed by empirical learning, more theoretically sophisticated and more ambitious in
scope. It advocates change not only for the domains of the minor and marginal but for
the legal heartland. 2 1
For Galanter, the idea that there is one right way of managing
disputes is "drained of credibility" 22 and he argues that legal institutions
should remain a part of the dispute resolution process, but in a way that
interacts and intersects with other processes. He challenges those who
are designing legal institutions to recognize that they are responsible not
only for the narrow world of adjudication, but that they must also
incorporate a broad range of dispute resolution possibilities. Problems,
experiences, or injuries may be turned into very different disputes
depending on who the parties are, what type of dispute it is, and the
institutions and processes available for resolution. Galanter notes that
sorting disputes by their suitability to particular processes are political
choices, and that these choices are reflective of our ideological
commitments about society.23
The political choices that Galanter recognizes lead to certain
types of disputes being assessed as appropriate for ADR while others are
not. This has led to so-called "soft" cases being steered into ADR: family
law, landlord and tenant, and neighbourhood disputes for example. ADR
was not seen as appropriate for "real law" cases like corporate
contractual disputes, constitutional, or other so-called "public disputes."
ADR was acceptable as long as people used it for the "garbage cases" and
saved the courts for the more important cases. It was not seen as a
realistic or acceptable alternative in cases where real legal decisions were
required. And as lawyers are in the front line of assessing disputes as
needing real law or not, they must be recognized as not only complicit in
but responsible for the decisions that they make.
Some writers have argued that ADR presents encouraging and
hopeful possibilities as long as it is used appropriately. Harry Edwards
favours the use of ADR in resolving private disputes, but warns against its
20 M. Galanter, "Introduction-Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute
Processing" (1989) 66 Den. U. L. Rev. xi at xi.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. at xiv.
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use in cases that implicate important public values.24 He argues that it is
acceptable for settling minor grievances between neighbours or simple
contract disputes, as this may result in higher rates of resolution.
Arguably, it is also because these matters are not important in the "real
world of law" in which he presides. He is concerned that ADR could be
extended to resolve difficult and complex issues like constitutional or
public law issues and in this way, its use could lead to the use of non-
legal values to resolve important social issues. He cautions that such
usage of ADR could delimit public rights and duties.
For Edwards and others, ADR can be an alternative to, but clearly
not a replacement for, the judicial process. This argument reaffirms the
belief that the adversary system has a significant and irreplaceable role
to play in our society. Many writers have reiterated this view and have
argued that the move to ADR as a means to increase settlement prior to
or without referral to the court system is a dangerous road to travel. The
issue seems to have become divided into two very clear camps:
settlement or adjudication. However, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has
noted, the issue is not as clear cut as it seems.2S As she describes, the
writing in the area tends to focus on the subject as if there are two
distinct processeS-ADR or adjudication-when in reality they frequently
meld into each other. In addition, writing on ADR tends to be written as
if it was one process rather than recognizing that there are many diverse
qualities within the different forms: negotiation differs from mediation
which has different characteristics from arbitration, while settlement
conferences or mini-trials differ again from mediation-arbitration
situations. Therefore, when writers such as Edwards discuss the notion
that ADR is appropriate for certain cases, it is often unclear which form
of ADR is meant.
Other writers have recognized that the issue is not so binary in
nature and that a more individualized approach is required; one must
look at the dispute and the disputants. To contextualize both of these
factors will aid in the discussion and ultimate determination as to what
process may be the most appropriate. It is short-sighted and patronizing
to decide what type of resolution is best for certain types of disputes or
disputants. The people involved in the dispute should have input into
the manner in which they want the matter resolved. As Menkel-
24 See H.T. Edwards, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?" (1986) 99
Harv. L Rev. 668.
25 See C. Menkel-Meadow, "Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases)" (1995) 83 Geo. L.J. 2663 [hereinafter "Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?"].
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Meadow has noted, there are many processes to consider as well as
many relevant factors that should be taken into consideration. 26 Some
of these factors include the fact that "[t]he diverse interests of the
participants in the dispute, the legal system, and society may not be the
same." 2 7  In addition, "[i]ssues of fairness, legitimacy, economic
efficiency, privacy, publicity, emotional catharsis or empathy, access,
equity among disputants, and lawmaking may differ in importance for
different actors in the system, and they may vary by case." 28
For Menkel-Meadow, there are no easy answers to the questions
about which settlements are good and which are not or when
adjudication should be preferred over settlement. She argues that it is
difficult to specify criteria in advance that would allow certain cases to
be slotted for adjudication and others to be channeled into settlement.
For Menkel-Meadow, there are "philosophical, as well as instrumental,
democratic, ethical and human justifications for settlement."29 She also
points out that many who criticize settlement suffer from what she calls
"litigation romanticism."30 As Menkel-Meadow accurately identifies,
many who are against settlement privilege adjudication and focus on its
structural and institutional values while ignoring the participants. It is of
little comfort to the participants that certain institutional values may be
met. Individuals may have little concern about the precedential or
public value of their particular dispute but may be very concerned about
the psychological and financial cost of the proceedings. There are
important values that should be considered in the debate for and against
settlement: "consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect,
empathy and emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions,
equity, access, and yes, even justice."31 Compromise may mean that
both parties have lost, whereas settlement may allow both parties'
interests to be met, if not completely, at least in a satisfactory way that
indicates agreement; a win-win outcome rather than lose-lose.
This article is not focused on the settlement versus litigation
debate. However, it is important to note that the debate exists before I
move to the next section, which reviews the current state of adjudication.
My position throughout this article is closer to Menkel-Meadow than
26 Ibid. at 2666.
27 1bid.
281Ibid.
29 Ibid at 2669.
30 Ibid
31 Ibid. at 2669-70.
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not. However, I do not wholeheartedly adopt her arguments. I do agree
that what is required is a particularized and contextualized examination
of the dispute and the parties involved. The people involved must be
provided with accurate, reasonable, and useful information in order to
make an informed decision about the process they choose. This
information has commonly been absent from lawyer-client discussions.
People are routinely steered into the adversary system because this is
where lawyers make their money. However, if lawyers take over and run
with the ADR system, the same problem may result. People will be
directed into certain processes by their counsel, based on the lawyers'
needs or preferences rather than being given a choice of processes.
Lawyers must have the disputants involved in the resolution of their
dispute. This can only be done by providing accurate, comprehensive
information on all the options and the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each. This requires lawyers to educate themselves
about the options, separate their interests from those of their clients',
and seek dispute resolution that is particularized and contextualized to
each disputant's individual needs.
III. SO WHAT'S SO WRONG WITH THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM ANYWAY?
Rebellious subjects, enemies to peace,
Throw your mistemper'd weapons to the ground
And hear the sentence of your moved Prince.
Three civil brawls, bred of an airy word,
By thee, old Capulet and Montague,
Have thrice disturb'd the quiet of our streets
And made Verona's ancient citizens
Cast by their grave beseeming ornaments
To wield old partisans, in hands as old,
Canker'd with peace, to part your canker'd hate.
If ever you disturb our streets again
Your lives shall pay the foifeit of the peace.32
In Shakespeare's Verona, the solution to any problem was
simple. The Prince ordered the parties to cease and desist or forfeit
their lives. If only dispute resolution were so easy-royal decrees
32 Romeo and Juliet, Act I, Scene i, 84-100.
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instead of lawyers, judges, and courtrooms. However, since the tyranny
of royal decree is thankfully missing from our current way of life, other
methods of resolution must be sought.
A. Sure We Have Problems, But...
After the naming, blaming, and claiming is complete, a dispute
remains to be dealt with. If one chooses not to "let it go," a solution is
sought. Many disputes are resolved without the involvement of lawyers,
courts, and the judicial system. People often try to resolve situations on
their own. The majority of disputes do not end up in the civil justice
system and those that do rarely reach a court. Even though few
disputants resort to litigation, and fewer still end up in court, the public
is of the view that there is a litigation explosion. As Galanter notes:
Public discussion of our civil justice system resounds with a litany of quarter-truths:
America is the most litigious society in the course of all human history; Americans sue at
the drop of a hat; the courts are brimming over with frivolous lawsuits; courts are a first
rather than a last resort; runaway juries make capricious awards to undeserving
claimants; immense punitive damage awards are routine; litigation is undermining our
ability to compete economically.3 3
Despite public perception to the contrary, only a very small
percentage of people's problems ever become disputes and even fewer
of these become lawsuits.3 4 Galanter borrows the term "hyperlexis
syndrome" to describe the "alleged high rates of disputing and
litigation."3s He argues that all of the myths about the civil justice
system are false, though "in a complicated way."36 He outlines how little
empirical data exists about the legal system and concludes that the critics
of the system have falsely portrayed its deficiencies so as to encourage
the search for, and embracing of, alternatives. He concludes that despite
the deficiencies that exist, "American institutions provide influential
33 M. Galanter, "News From Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice" (1993) 71 Den.
U. L. Rev. 77 at 77 [hereinafter "News From Nowhere"].
34 See "Reading the Landscape," supra note 14 at 5 where Galanter notes that "only a small
portion of troubles and injuries become disputes" and "only a small portion of these become
lawsuits"; "of those that do become disputes the vast majority are abandoned, settled or processed
without adjudication." He admits that current numbers show a slight rise but that the United States
per capita rates are similar to those of England, Australia, and Ontario. In Canada, between 95-97
per cent of civil suits do not advance to litigation. See also G.A. Chornenki & C.E. Hart, Bypass
Court: A Dispute Resohution Handbook (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1996).
35 "Reading the Landscape," supra note 14 at 6.
36 Ibid. at 77.
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models for the governance of business relations, the processing of
disputes, and the protection of citizens."37
Galanter and others trace at least some of the genesis of the
myths about the civil justice system to comments made by then United
States Chief Justice Burger and others at the 1976 Pound Conference.38
Justice Burger suggested community panels could be used to resolve
small claims and that greater use of arbitration should be considered. It
was also at the Pound Conference that Frank Sander gave his well-
known speech calling for a "multi-doored courthouse." 3 9 Though
Sander called for alternatives, he was not proposing the replacement of
courts but rather a better use for them, arguing that we should "reserve
the courts for those activities for which they are best suited and to avoid
swamping and paralyzing them with cases that do not require their
unique capabilities."40
This clearly begs the question: what are the courts' unique
abilities? For many who have experienced the court system, the answers
would not be those Professor Sander was referring to. The current court
system seems to be uniquely adept at producing unreasonable delay,
exorbitant cost, unhappy disaffected participants, uneven and often
unfair results. Though Galanter is right -to dispel the myths of the
litigation explosion, the truth is that there is a litigation implosion. The
adversary system is clearly not meeting the needs of many of the
participants. The only people who seem to be profiting are the lawyers
and judges, and it is a profit derived from the dissatisfaction and dismay
of litigants. While many writers accept that the system has its problems,
they are able to maintain a positive and hopeful outlook. Emond says
that "confrontation and the adversarial system have served North
America well and will continue to do so. There are few better ways of
3 7 
"News from Nowhere," supra note 33 at 102.
38 The 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration came to be called the Pound Conference because it invoked the 1906 speech given
by Roscoe Pound: see R. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1970). For further explanation on the significance of
the Pound Conference to the development of ADR, see also L. Nader, "The ADR Explosion-The
Implication of Rhetoric in Legal Reform" (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 269.
39 F.E.A. Sander, "Varieties of Dispute Processing" in The Pound Conference (1979) 70
F.R.D. ill at 131. Sander did not actually coin the term "multi-doored courthouse" but called for a
lobby where disputants could be channeled through a screening clerk to one of seven doors.
40 Ibid. at 132.
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rigorously testing facts, witness credibility and evidence than in the
adversarial setting of the courtroom."41
A critique of Emond's love affair with and faith in the adversary
system is fodder enough for another article at another time; an
examination of each of his claims is beyond the scope of this article, but I
will comment briefly on some of his assertions. First, the notion that the
adversary system has served North America well can only be true if
Emond is referring to lawyers, judges, corporations, and the like. For
these overwhelmingly male and white participants, the adversary system
has provided well-paid employment, power, prestige, status, and
outcomes that preserve and maintain the status quo. On the other hand,
the adversary system has a poor record when it comes to women, people
of colour, Aboriginal peoples, the poor, and other marginalized and
oppressed groups. These people have been either excluded from the
system altogether or legal insult has been added to their personal injury.
Secondly, if Emond really believes that the courtroom is the best
place for testing facts, witness credibility, and evidence, then he has little
experience with other fora. What is tested in the courtroom is a lawyer's
ability to obscure and obfuscate the facts, manipulate and manhandle
witnesses, and withhold or conceal evidence. The adversary system does
not test facts, it merely chooses between the two sets of facts presented
to it. And often the facts it has chosen have deprived people of rights
rather than recognized them. In the past, courts have accepted facts like
these: women are not people; people of colour are not equal to white
people; Aboriginal people do not have a claim to the land that they had
founded, cared for, and preserved for centuries. This very brief list of
the court's fact finding ability provides little evidence of a "well served
North America." I do not share Emond's belief that the adversary
system can be trusted to be fair or just.
Finally, Emond believes that Wigmore's "'legal engine' 42 that
could" will find the truth. Even if there were an identifiable,
distinguishable, non-situated "truth" available to be found, the
courtroom would be the last place to find it. It is precisely because of
truth's situatedness, malleability, and perpetual movement that the
adversary system works so well for the usual and traditional players.
Courtr6oms, lawsuits, and litigation are not about "truth;" they are
about winning (and losing). And the way to win is to get "your truth"
accepted rather than the other side's. Tomorrow, "your truth" may be
41 Emond, supra note 13 at 4.
42 Ibid. at 4, where Emond refers to J.H. Wigmore,A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Tials at Common Law, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1940).
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exactly the opposite of what you argued today. This is what lawyers do
despite their claims to the contrary. They argue what will win, not
necessarily what is "true." And this presentation of "truth" leads many
people to have little faith in the system that Emond and others extol.
The disputants involved in the adversary system would have very
different responses to the question "how has the adversary system served
you?"
Emond does admit that the adversary system is not the place to
solve all problems. He recognizes that the process tends to turn all
disputes into "legal disputes" and that rather than resolving problems,
the adversary system may actually make things worse. He argues that
the "search for alternative dispute resolution processes is ... a search to
more precisely locate adjudication and in particular judicial adjudication
on the continuum of dispute resolution mechanisms." 43 This search
would, according to Emond, increase the available options for resolving
disputes and ensure that they are better suited to the particular needs of
the dispute and the disputants. In addition, moving towards alternatives
would allow the role of adjudication to be limited, remedy some of
adjudication's problems, and encourage the use of less adversarial
techniques. Even though there is "nothing inherently wrong" with the
system, Emond embraces and encourages a movement away from it. On
closer reading though, it is clear that what he envisions is not two
separate features but more of a double bill. ADR will not replace
adjudication or litigation but will be more of a full-length trailer.
However, my concern is that if lawyers continue to be the authors,
producers, directors, and stars of both productions, seeking glamour,
glory, and glitter, the public will continue to pay the price. Clearly, the
"truth" is rarely found where lawyers abound.
Other writers expand on and adopt Emond's faith in the
adversary process while also agreeing that alternatives should be used.
Galanter argues that "contemporary patterns of disputing" are "an
adaptive (but not necessarily optimal) response to a set of changing
conditions." 4 4 Technology has created increased opportunities for
injuries to occur and social knowledge has improved people's awareness
that they may have a right to seek redress. As government regulation
increases, its involvement in remedying harm also increases. As a result,
legal remedies become more widely available. Even though "there is
more law," mediation and bargaining resolve most disputes; further, "the
43 Emond, supra note 13 at 4.
4 4
"Reading the Landscape," supra note 14 at 69.
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courts occupy a larger portion of the symbolic universe and litigation
seems omnipresent." 45
If the "litigation explosion" is more in the minds of the public
than in the reality of the numbers, where did this misperception come
from? The statistics indicate that the rates of litigation, while rising, are
not as high as advertised and reported. According to Galanter, much of
the responsibility for the dissemination of this exaggerated information
lies with "the weakness of contemporary legal scholarship and policy
analysis." 46 He argues that the statistics that have led to the public
perception and acceptance of a "litigation explosion" are the result of
poor research. The situation is not as it has been promoted nor as
people widely believe. Galanter calls on legal scholars to remedy the
misinformation that has been disseminated.
Clearly, it is a message that should be heeded. However, it is
unclear why the people who benefit from this misinformation would be
willing to correct it. Lawyers as well as legal scholars are well served by a
public that perceives there to be a crisis. The boon for lawyers comes on
many fronts: it allows them to increase their hourly rate because there is
such competition for their time, to bill for the increased hours it takes to
wade through the crowded courthouse, and to gain increased prestige
and status for the profoundly arduous work they do. On the other hand,
legal scholars have increased material for their intricate and lengthy
examinations of the rise in the litigious state of the public and the
concurrent need for alternatives. Indeed, ironically, Galanter himself
has benefited from the very situation that he describes.
The fact that the adversary system has its problems is accepted
and admitted by Galanter. He encourages the use of alternatives.
However, his aim is to ensure that the movement towards alternatives is
based on accurate information. On this view, it is not necessary to trash
the current system to look for alternatives. Galanter argues that viewing
litigation as "a destructive force, undermining other social institutions
[is] misleadingly one-sided." 47 He views litigation as not only an
"assertion of individual will" but also a "reaching out for communal help
and affirmation." 48 Old notions of practice should be challenged and
new ones allowed to enter in order to acknowledge and embrace
45 Ibid- at 70.
46 Ibid. at 71.
471bi at 70.
48 Ibid.
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"multiple, partial and emergent" communities. 4 9  In this way,
alternatives are additions, not replacements, and litigation may not be
regarded as an "antagonist of community."50
Clearly, ADR proponents should not, and need not, demonize the
adversary process in order to justify the need or desire to seek out
alternatives. At the same time, however, the turn towards alternatives
should not be done at the expense of remedying the problems with
litigation and adjudication. It is incumbent on those who have created
or added to the problem to help in determining and implementing
appropriate remedies. ADR cannot fix the problem; it is one method by
which some of the problems may be eased. However, the problems
remain. It is a system in need of repair and the repair can only come
from within. Lawyers, judges, government, and legal scholars must look
at the underlying premises that have informed and influenced the system
as it now exists. And they must not turn away to alternatives without
ensuring that the problems with the adversary system are addressed.
Those who have benefited immensely from the system, through financial
gain, power, status, and prestige are charged with the reparation of a
system that has served them well. The adversary system was created by
and continues to be driven by those who work within it and benefit from
it. It is incumbent on these same people to assist in its remediation at
the same time as they seek alternatives.
B. Looking For Justice in All the Wrong Places
As Emond has noted, the problems with the adversary system are
wide-ranging. He lists the problems as cost, process, and result.5l This
list leads one to ask what, if anything, is going right? Maybe it should be
considered that the adversary system has outlived its usefulness. Maybe
the search should not be for an alternative but for a total replacement.
One well-known scholar suggests that the system may have outlived its
time and that it is inappropriate in a "post-modern, multi-cultural
world." 52 Menkel-Meadow proposes the "heretical notion that the
49 Ibid.
5 0 Ibid.
51 See Emond, supra note 13 at 5.
52 C. Menkel-Meadow, "The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-
Cultural World" (1996) 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 at 5 [hereinafter "Adversary System"].
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adversary system may no longer be the best way for our legal system to
deal with all of the matters that come within its purview."5 3 She argues:
[T]he adversary system is inadequate, indeed dangerous, for satisfying a number of
important goals of any legal or dispute resolution system ... we should rethink both the
goals our legal system should serve and the methods we use to achieve those goals. For
those who cleave to the adversary system ... the burden of proof [must shift] to them to
convince us that the adversary system continues to do its job better than other methods
we might use.5 4
Courts may not be the best institutional setting for resolving
some of the disputes we continue to put before them. According to
Menkel-Meadow, the "[b]inary, oppositional presentation of facts in
dispute are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate
distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies
complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies."5 5 Clearly, as noted
above, many cases do not lend themselves to binary solutions and many
problems are not easily turned into win-lose or right-wrong solutions.
Often there is no accurate way to determine the facts because frequently
both parties have some entitlements or because the human equities
cannot be easily or equally split. Modern life presents people with
complex problems which require complex solutions. Because courts
have what Menkel-Meadow calls "limited remedial imaginations,"5 6 they
are ill-equipped to resolve the difficult disputes that come before them.57
These comments merely serve to reinforce my earlier arguments.
Clearly, the commonly-held assumptions that encourage the use of the
adversary system should be more rigorously examined and questioned;
the court's claims of objectivity, neutrality, and fairness are not borne
out by the results. As Menkel-Meadow points out, multiculturalism and
the debates surrounding it should be a reminder that "there is
demographic, as well as epistemological 'positionality.'"58 All people do
not see all things in the same way. What Menkel-Meadow reinforces is
that, as people gain more and more knowledge about knowledge, there
is a resulting need to look at the way things get done. A postmodern
approach illustrates that there is no "truth" that stands alone,
53 Ibi at 5.
5 4Ibid. at 6.
55 Ibid.
56 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem-Solving" (1984) 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754 at 754.
57See "Adversary System," supra note 52 at 6-7.
5 8 Ibid. at 9.
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independent of the knowers and the known: truth is illusive, partial,
interpretable, and dependent. The adversary system is based on a belief
that there are "truth and justice" criteria that have somehow escaped
historicization, contextualization, and influence. There can be no such
independent or unaffected state. Problems will be created in every
system or process.
After her postmodern reflections, Menkel-Meadow advises that
she has not come to bury the adversary system, but to improve it. Et tu
Carrie! She notes that any system that could be devised to replace the
adversary system will have its own faults. In effect, she concludes that
any system will be impacted by the people that inhabit it and will be
affected by external and internal forces. In short, the factors that have
led to the problems with the current system cannot fail to be replicated
to some degree in any other system. No system can be devised in
isolation of what has gone before. Any process is created from the
collective input of people. The knowledge, experience, values,
prejudices, and biases of those people will impact on the result. Process
cannot be created without being affected by the process of creating it.
This does not mean that there can be no change because things will
always end up the same. What this requires is that people and process
creators must be aware of, and open to, their own particular contingent
and situated state. The right process is not out there waiting to be
discovered. There is not one answer to the problems with the adversary
system and its players but many. Postmodern thought leads to options,
not solutions and to possibilities, not pronouncements. In Menkel-
Meadow's postmodern legal system, parties will have a greater choice
about how they will resolve their disputes. As her numerous articles
attest, she sees ADR as providing some of that choice. In the next
section, I will examine Menkel-Meadow's and others' claims about the
promise of ADR.
IV. JUSTICE AND HARMONY FOR ALL
Where be these enemies? Capulet! Montague!
See what a scourge is laid upon your hate
That Heav'n finds means to kill your joys with love.
And Ifor winking at your discords too
Have lost a brace of kinsmen. All are punish'd.
A gloomingpeace this morning with it brings,
The Sun for sorrow will not show his head.
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Go hence to have more talk of these sad things:
Some shall be pardon'd and some punished.
For never was a story of more woe
Than this of Juliet and her Romeo.5 9
Romeo and Juliet die before their families end their bitter feud.
It is only after the families recognize what has been lost forever that they
are able to come to a sadly empty resolution. The terrible sacrifice of
their children allows them to put aside the anger and hostility that has
consumed them for years. It is unclear whether adjudication would have
been able to resolve the Capulet-Montague feud. There is insufficient
information about what sparked the long-standing dispute. However,
one can speculate that the adversary nature of litigation would not have
helped dispel the anger and hatred that consumed these families. But
would ADR have done any better? Would negotiation have been able to
flesh out a resolution that the parties could live with or would mediation
have been a better choice? Perhaps an arbitrator would have been
required to bring a measure of formal fact-finding and decisionmaking
to the process. The outcome is speculative at best, but it is not
impossible to imagine that some resolution short of the death of their
children could have been reached. The situation is not unlike that in the
biblical story of Solomon. When deciding which of two women should
be given the child over whom both were claiming ownership, he ordered
the baby cut in half with one half being given to each woman. In the
story of Solomon, the real mother relinquishes her claim to the child, as
she would prefer it to live with someone efse rather than see it die. In
Romeo and Juliet, if the Capulets and Montagues had known the
eventual outcome, they would have reached some resolution in order to
avoid their tragedy. Surely they would have realized that any resolution
would have been better than the one that resulted.
The unyielding bitterness of the Capulet-Montague feud is
replicated far too frequently in today's courtrooms or law office battles.
Parties, with the assistance of their eager lawyers, vigorously assert their
claims, vehemently deny liability and vow to fight to the death.60 Unlike
the tragic ending in Romeo and Juliet, the threat remains mainly
59 Romeo andJuliet, Act V, Scene iii, 291-310. The prince tells of how the feud between the
Capulets and Montagues has led to the deaths of Romeo and Juliet. Montague and Capulet
forswear their hostility and vow to erect statues in memory of the young lovers.
60 Images of battle, sports, and sex are pervasive in the adversary system. See E.G.
Thornburg, "Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape the Adversary
System" (1995) 10 Wis. Women's L.J. 225.
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metaphorical. However, the pain endured by the parties is often all too
real. Relationships are irrevocably damaged. People are emotionally
and financially destroyed. And the reputation of lawyers and the civil
justice system continues to decline. Lawyers and their role in the
adversary system have been under fire in recent years. Public
antagonism toward the system is widespread. People believe in the myth
of a litigation explosion. The public openly reviles lawyers and blames
them for much of the trouble with the system. As a result, calls for
change began to be heard. People were fed up with the emotional,
psychological, and financial cost of litigation. The search for alternatives
began.
Accordingly, in this section I will examine the birth of ADR and
discuss whether it has fulfilled the promises that accompanied its
creation. Is it better, kinder, gentler, more empowering, and satisfactory
to its participants? My critique of ADR falls into three broad areas: first,
that it was developed on the basis of incorrect and inaccurate notions
about the failures of the adversary system; second, that it is particularly
problematic as a mandated process in certain cases; and finally, that the
ADR movement is at risk of being co-opted and taken over by the very
people who have created the problems in the adversary system-lawyers.
A. Where DidADR Come From and Why Do We Need It?
Even though it may appear that the call for alternatives began
with the public, some writers have outlined the complicity of the legal
profession in not only answering the call for alternatives but creating the
need for them in the first place. Lawyers recognized that the public was
seriously disenchanted with the adversary system and was turning away
from it. In response, the ADR movement was born. Some have traced
the beginning of the movement, or at least a turning point in it, to the
Pound Conference in 1976.61 According to Laura Nader, this
conference was one result of the public debate that began in the 1960s
when opposing groups began to voice dissatisfaction with the state of the
legal system.62 One group wanted to reform the system by including
previously excluded groups, whereas another group's agenda was to find
alternative processes outside of the adversary system.
61 See supra note 38.
62 See L. Nader, "Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology" (1993) 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 at 5.
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The Pound Conference picked up on the public dissatisfaction
with the adversary system. Speaker after speaker lamented the terrible
state of the legal system. Alternative processes were portrayed as
"agencies of settlement or reconciliation, peace rather than war."63 In
this way, the first step in the call for alternatives began with the false
portrayal of the adversary system's deficiencies. According to Nader,
this rhetoric, pervasive at the Pound Conference, was designed to
manipulate "men's beliefs for political ends."64 Once people believed
that the adversary system was in crisis, the impetus to search for
alternatives was created. Nader believes that many scholars (she
identifies Galanter as one) have now come to realize that the ADR
movement was built on a foundation of sand. According to Nader, "the
years following the Pound Conference saw the public immersed in ADR
rhetoric, which by the end of the decade had the quality of discursive
cement." 65 Members of the judiciary, leading lawyers, and alternative
dispute professionals propounded the need for alternatives; they
reiterated the problems with the legal system and the positive and
healing aspects of ADR. Nader says:
The rhetoric was restricted and formulaic, and its users were assertive and repetitive.
They made broad generalizations, invoked authority and danger, and presented values as
facts. The Chief Justice [Warren Burger] warned that adversarial modes of conflict
resolution were tearing the country apart, and that there had to be a better way. He
claimed that Americans were inherently litigious, and that ADR was more civilized than
the adversary process.66
Thus, according to Nader the framework for a "harmony law
model" began.6 7 Clearly, many people were drawn to ADR out of
frustration with a system that had serious problems.68 It appeared as a
solution to the mess that was the adversary system. People hoped that
ADR would allow for a more respectful, humane, and caring approach to
people's problems. Many people were eager to jump, and did so without
examining their leap of faith. Nader problematizes this leap for its lack
63 Ibid. at 6. The metaphors of battle once again.
64 Ibid. citing K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969)
at 41.
65 Nader, supra note 62 at 6.
6 6 Ibid at 7.
6 7 Ibid
68 When Nader refers to AOR, she is speaking generally of the movement towards alternatives
to the judicial process. However, later, she refers more specifically to mediation rather than other
forms of ADR. My focus in this section is similar. Many of my comments are directed to ADR in
general as an alternative process, but I will focus on mediation more specifically in parts.
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of critical thinking. ADR proponents were so zealous in their embracing
of an alternative that they did not engage in any serious critical inquiry
into the process they were propounding. She suggests that some of the
reasons for this lack of critical questioning comes from the existence of
the "harmony ideology" that was internal to the movement. However, in
Nader's view, this harmony was coercive in nature, and resulted in the
discouragement of critical thinking as people embraced the notions of
agreement and accord. Many embraced ADR in response to the
competitive, win-lose mentality of the legal system. They sought
alternatives that appeared to provide an escape from discord and
dissonance. In essence, they sought peace. Some lawyers were tired of
the adversarial nature of the adversarial process. They were
disenchanted with the system they had embraced and had grown to
dislike the people they had become from working in it. They no longer
wanted to be the kind of lawyers that they had been taught to be and
had, at least at some point, accepted they must be in order to succeed.
What they had accepted as required behaviour and attitudes for being a
"good advocate" was now making them miserable.
It is important to note that lawyers are created, not born.
Arguably, the creative process begins in law school where students are
encouraged to think and act a certain way. Most accept this
indoctrination as a necessary requirement. It has been said that this
discouragement of critical thinking and individualism begins in the
hierarchical structure of law school. Duncan Kennedy's comments are
well-recalled:
You will come to expect that as a lawyer you will live in a world in which essential parts of
you are not represented.... And you will come to expect that there is nothing you can do
about it. One develops ways of coping with these expectations-turning off attention and
involvement ... participating actively while ignoring the offensive elements of the
interchange, even reinterpreting as inoffensive things that would otherwise make you
boil. These are the skills that incapacitate rather than empower, skills that will help you
imprison yourself in practice.69
Kennedy's comments presage the continuance of a
disempowering and incapacitating reality. Many law students' goals
upon graduation are to work in large law firms. In the corporate world,
law is big business, money is the bottom line, and fitting in is required for
success. Lawyers are rewarded for following and doing rather than
leading and thinking. No one is interested in what the young lawyer may
think; they are interested in how many billable hours can be charged to
69 D. Kennedy, "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics of
Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) 50 at 57.
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the client. What counts are results. Anyone who criticizes the working
conditions or prevailing attitudes is admonished to remember that this is
what big firms are about. This awareness and acceptance of the big firm
culture is common among law students. It is a common topic of
conversation, and is seen as a natural, normal expectation of "real-life
law." If you criticize it, you are told that you are clearly not "cut out for
the big time." If you had any critical thoughts when you entered law
school, and you hope to succeed, you learned to keep them to yourself or
forget them altogether.
Lawyers who have been discouraged from thinking critically do
not criticize any system they are in. And they will bring this lack of
critical awareness, this tunnel vision, goal-oriented, and win-lose
mentality to the process of ADR. In order for there to be any possibility
for an alternative process, the creators must be able to envision
something different; in short, they must be able to imagine. In order to
ensure that ADR comes close to realizing its many promises, the
participants in its creation must learn to suspend old beliefs and habits
and embrace a newer, more aware, and responsive way of looking at
dispute resolution. Old thinking will recreate old ways.
B. Are There Some Places ADR Should Not Go?
One offshoot of the lack of critical thinking is that people forget
to inquire whether certain processes work well for specific people. In
the embrace of ADR as a more harmonious, caring, and responsive
process, assumptions are made that it is universally acceptable and
usable. However, for many, some of the attributes that ADR proponents
extol are the very things that make it unacceptable in certain cases.
Specifically, the lack of formal process and accountability in mediation
leads to a concern about the potential for abuse. Nader has commented:
Mandatory mediation abridges American freedom because it is often outside the law,
eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal protection before an adversary law, and is
generally hidden from view. The situation is much like that in psychotherapy, little
regulation and little accountability. Mind control activities operate best in isolation, and
those who have read the literature on influence understand that people in life crises are
vulnerable to coercive influence. 70
Mandatory mediation's coercive and abusive potential is
highlighted and clarified by Trina Grillo.7 1  Grillo is clear and
70 Nader, supra note 62 at 12-13.
71 Grillo, supra note 16.
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unequivocal in arguing that. mediation is a dangerous process for
women. For Grillo, family mediation operates as control: control in
defining the problem, control of speech and expression, and control over
the public record. Of particular concern is that these controls operate in
a confidential, private forum rather than in a public open courtroom.
Grillo is especially critical of the presumed equality of the mediation
process and its ignorance of the real inequality that is overwhelmingly
present. She notes that mediators frequently frame cases as between
equal parties and yet refuse to recognize that there is unequal
responsibility and power between the two. In addition, mediators often
refuse to allow women to express anger during mediation sessions, as
this is characterized as contrary to a search for resolution. The result is
that womens' real issues are ignored, their participation is controlled,
and their behaviour is modified to fit the expectations of the mediator.
For Grillo, mandatory mediation is a dangerous environment in which
patriarchy and prejudice are allowed to flourish. 72
Grillo's comments deserve thoughtful consideration. A full
examination of her position is beyond the scope of this article. Clearly,
women have historically been in relationships of unequal control and
power. The history of women's engagement with the law and legal
systems is for the most part a story of oppression, unequal treatment,
discrimination, and disentitlement. Family law, civil law, property law,
constitutional law, and criminal law abound with unfair results.
However, when Grillo calls for a rejection of mediation, it must be
recalled that the vast majority of this sad history took place within the
adversarial process. Courts have not been friendly or welcoming places
for women, and as Grillo points out, mandatory mediation may be no
better. This illustrates my thesis throughout that the process is as good
or as bad as those who have the power to control it. Litigation is not
necessarily bad, just as mediation is not necessarily good. What is
required is an individualized approach that fits the person and the
problem to the process.
Grillo is not the only vocal critic of the undelivered redemptory
promise of ADR for certain cases. Many scholars have expressed concern
about the impacts of informal and private dispute definition and
resolution on the traditionally and historically disadvantaged. Like
Grillo and Nader, these critics are particularly troubled by situations in
which the parties are of unequal power, the issues involve some facet of
"public rights" (i.e. child custody), and the decisionmakers or outcome
directors are free from public scrutiny and public record. In these cases,
72 See ibid. at 1600-07.
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the discussion usually results in a call for an individualized approach to
dispute resolution, allowing adjudication when desirable and ADR when
an alternative mode of resolution is both requested by the parties and of
equal benefit to both.
Eric Yamamoto argues that "for those on society's margins ...
ADR presents problems of considerable importance." 73 His concerns
are similar to those expressed by others: ADR removes disputes from
public scrutiny, undermining the values of deterrence and public
education, and transforming public debates about rights into private
judgements about needs, which allows hidden arbitrators to decide
disputes according to personal perceptions of minority needs.74 The fear
of many of these critics is that the informalism which at times is a
welcome part of ADR may heighten the danger for minority groups.
These critics argue that there is a danger in relinquishing the formalized
adjudication process which requires adherence to the rule of law. And
they worry that when formalism is abandoned, the rule of law is avoided
or overlooked and bias is more likely to creep into the process.
In an effort to determine the effect that ADR could have on
certain groups, Richard Delgado and others examined ADR'S informal
structure and determined that the risk of biased treatment for racial
minorities, women, and the poor did increase in an informal process.75
Drawing upon social-psychological theories and studies, they concluded
that people are more likely to act on their prejudices in an informal
setting like ADR produces, whereas the formal style of adjudication tends
to suppress biases. According to Delagado's study, the risk of prejudice
is greatest when there is direct confrontation between disputants of
disparate power; there are few rules governing the interaction, the
setting is closed, and the issue is highly personal. 76 These concerns are
similar to those expressed by Grillo and others with respect to women in
family law disputes. I suggest that this debate can be summarized as a
concern about the parties being able to assert their rights in a climate of
unequal power. This inequality of power is clearly a feature in many
disputes, whether resolution is sought through adjudication or ADR.
Arguably the power imbalance itself may even have an impact on
73 Yamamoto, supra note 16 at 360.
74 For similar arguments that ADR shifts the focus from a rights-based analysis to a needs-
based one with the result that existing power imbalances are reinforced, see D.M. Trubek, "The
Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure" (1988)
51:4 L. & Contemp. Probs. 111 at 131; and see Delgado etal.,supra note 16.
75 See Delgado et aL, supra note 16 at 1375-91.
76 Ibid at 1402.
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whether a dispute ever reaches the adjudicative stage. The adversary
system is a costly process in which to participate. Power's inexorable link
to money privileges those who have more of it.
While many critics hail the "safety" of the rule of law within the
adjudication process, I question their reliance on the adversary system to
address minority group concerns. The history of the adversary system is
not littered with many successes in these areas but has for the most part
perpetuated the status quo. This has meant that male, white viewpoints
are recognized more often than others. Clearly what is required of any
process is representation by as many diverse groups as possible. An
increase in diversity does not necessarily mean a resulting positive
response for minority groups, women, or the poor, but it can certainly
begin the process towards more equitable and relevant outcomes. 77
Other criticisms of ADR address more general concerns. In a
recent article, Yamamoto briefly reviews some of its most well-known
criticisms.78 He notes that even though there has been ongoing study
and critique of ADR by mainstream scholars, there has been a withering
in the last few years of criticism of the impact of ADR on society's
outsiders. He reviews the work of Delagado, Grillo, Bryan, and others
and wonders why the critiques, eagerly and welcomely begun, have
disappeared. He notes that there appears to be little attention paid now
to the race and gender critiques of the late eighties and early nineties.
His questioning is reminiscent of the concerns expressed by Nader about
the lack of critical thinking within the legal profession. Perhaps the
proponents of ADR are so eager to extol its virtues that they are unwilling
or even unable to notice its faults. The problem seems to be that neither
adjudication nor ADR are being adequately examined or evaluated. In
my view, it may not be surprising that little criticism is coming forward
about the latter. The following section may shed light into why there is a
veritable critical darkness about the problems of ADR.
C. The Law of ADR
The main challenge that ADR must overcome if it is to fulfil its
promise of being truly alternative is to recognize the real and present
danger that co-optation presents. It was created out of the adversary
77 For a discussion about the issue of representation in law, see M.L. Minow, "From Class
Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of Representation in the Law" (1991) 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 269.
78 See E.K. Yamamoto, "ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?" (1996) 36 Santa Clara L. Rev.
1055.
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system by many of the same players who created the problems that they
seek to leave behind. How can an alternative process be created by the
people who have inhabited the current system? Can the people involved
in the adversary system leave behind their adversarial thinking, their
competitive natures, and their self-interest and truly create something
different? How does an alternative prosper if the people involved,
lawyers and judges, continue to act in their traditional, adversarial,
competitive, win-lose mode? Can an alternative be mandated or does
the action of mandating remove the principal purpose and aim of an
alternative process?
Menkel-Meadow has contributed a great deal to this debate. In
her view, there is no doubt that ADR has been institutionalized and
legalized:
[A] critical challenge to the status quo has been blunted, indeed co-opted, by the very
forces I had hoped would be changed by some ADR forms and practices. In short, courts
try to use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and increase court efficiency at the
possible cost of realizing better justice. Lawyers may use ADR not for the
accomplishment of a "better" result, but as another weapon in the adversarial arsenal to
manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for perceived client
advantage. 79
Evidence of the co-opting of ADR abounds. Courts have adopted
many of ADR'S processes including negotiated settlements, arbitration,
mediation, mini-trials, and private judging. Courts are increasingly using
settlement conferences and mandatory mediation. In addition, private
consulting firms and professional entities promote ADR; public dispute
resolvers are privatized. 80 Law school curricula now include courses in
negotiation, mediation, and other alternative dispute processes. Law
societies have amended their rules of conduct to include the
79 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-opted or 'The Law of ADR' (1991) 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 at 3.
80 In Toronto, Ontario, a group of retired judges operate what they advertise as "An
Alternative Dispute Resolution Group" and call it "ADR Chambers." Law firms offer workshops
in negotiation and mediation skills, others advertise themselves as ADR firms providing expert
mediators or arbitrators in any number of substantive areas of law in which a dispute might arise.
Other firms advertise their service as process design experts who will assist in setting up dispute
resolution processes for other businesses. All of these services use lawyers and/or judges as dispute
resolvers.
[VOL. 36 No. 4802
1998] Would ADR Have Saved Romeo and Juliet?
requirement that lawyers consider ADR in all cases.8 1 Courts are
instituting mandatory ADR programs.8 2
Clearly ADR is in vogue. My questions are simple. What is or
can be alternative about it? What can be expected by these new ADR
providers? What is their motivation; their qualifications? When the
people involved are the same lawyers and judges who have operated in
the adversary system and adversarial mode, does the alternative look any
different or act any different than what is already in practice? Lawyers
offer ADR services because they are obligated to under their rules of
professional conduct. However, they are not obligated to get any
training in how to provide these services. Lawyers are experiencing the
same tough economic climate that all other businesses are. They are
losing clients and business. They will embrace the notion of ADR as a
new service that can be offered and in so doing increase their business.
That is not to say that some lawyers will not educate themselves and seek
training in ADR. Many will. However, many more will not. Many
lawyers will jump on the ADR bandwagon as a means to increase their
billings, not necessarily as a means to provide more creative, disputant
responsive services.
81 In April 1996, the Law Society of Upper Canada amended Rule 10(6.A.) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct to include this requirement: "[t]he lawyer should consider the appropriateness
of ADR to the resolution of issues in every case and, if appropriate, should inform the client of
ADR options and, if so instructed, take steps to pursue those options." See Law Society of Upper
Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct: Professional Conduct Handbook (Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada, 1996).
82 The ADR Centre of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was introduced in the Toronto
Region as a pilot project in 1994. Four of every ten cases filed at the courts were offered to the
ADR Centre, excluding family matters, motor vehicle claims, and construction liens. It was the first
court-connected ADR program in Canada. In an evaluation done by an external team led by Dr.
Julie Macfarlane of the University of Windsor, the project was found to be successful in providing
cheaper, faster, and more satisfactory results for many of the cases referred: see Ontario Ministry of
the Attorney General, Civil Justice Review: Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Court
of Justice, Ministry of the Attorney General, 1996) (Co-chairs: R.A. Blair & H. Cooper). In
February 1997, Attorney General Charles Harnick announced that as a result of the success of the
ADR Centre, mandatory mediation would be introduced for all civil cases, except family law
matters, starting in Toronto in 1997. After much discussion and consultation, the Ontario
Mandatory Mediation Program came into effect in January 1999. It will refer civil, non-family, case
managed actions to mediation on a mandatory basis. The program is fully implemented in Ottawa,
and partially implemented in Toronto, where currently 25 per cent of cases are subject to case
management: see Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as am. by 0. Reg.
453/98, r. 24.1 (mandatory mediation), and 0. Reg. 555196, r. 77 (case management). Under the
program, litigants will be able to select a mediator from an approved roster, a directory of private-
sector mediators who will provide mediation services for a set tariff.
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The rise in popularity of ADR comes at a time when anti-lawyer,
anti-government rhetoric is pervasive.8 3 Possibly the interest in and
popularity of ADR might have been different in a different social climate.
It is possible that if it had emerged at a time when lawyers were not
perceived as greedy, when people were eager for government regulation,
and when adjudication was less reviled, the move towards ADR would
appear less suspect. However, when adjudication is demonized and
announced as outmoded and inefficient, alternative processes become
more acceptable. In my view, the alternative must not usurp the
important public functions that adjudication can and should serve. The
problems with the adversary system should be dealt with in addition to
the search for and use of alternatives. Courts still have a purpose and
role to play in society and this role need not be removed in order to
allow for adjuncts to it.
Finally, if ADR is mandated, the alternative nature of the process
is lost. The point of an alternative should be to encourage access based
on the recognition by the parties that it serves a useful purpose. To
mandate participation merely recreates the adversary system and gives it
another name. The players are the same, the choice is removed and the
outcomes are driven by the lawyers rather than the parties. In a strange
reversal of process, people can choose to sue and be told they must
mediate.
V. CONCLUSION
The fact that the question that serves as the title of this paper-
Would ADR Have Saved Romeo and Juliet?-cannot be answered with
any certainty serves to illustrate my thesis. In the realm of dispute
resolution, as with all else in life, there is no certainty, there is no
"truth," and there is no one answer. Disputes have no singular point of
creation, no one mode of expression, and no uniform method of
resolution. Conflict resolution in each case must be tailored to meet the
specific needs of the individual. Those who seek to assist in dispute
resolution must recognize their role as one of assistance, not control.
Lawyers are not necessarily well-suited to that role. Those who wish to
engage in the service of dispute resolution must recognize their own
situatedness and interests. They must resist the urge to turn disputes
83 See J. Resnik, "Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication" (1995) 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 211 at 257.
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into modern tales of woe that perpetuate the "glooming peace"8 4 that
was the fate of the Capulets and the Montagues.
84 Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Scene iii, 305.
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